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ARGUMENT
THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AN
INJURY AND THE NEED FOR SUBSEQUENT
SURGERIES MUST BE DEMONSTRATED BY
EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY.
Plaintiff has asserted that the fact that her surgeon umtd nui toi in .in
opinion regarding H»e * IPM «>>t her need tor neck and wrist surgery should not preclude
the jury from finding such a coi-.:•-.-

.• nii11: ^ own testimony regarding

her physical complaints. However, in all but ihe mo^i nhvinus ot cases, testimony of
h

;: esses regarding the need for a specific type of medical

to permit a jur-

• •*:

:. }uate

..^:.srion. As stated by the COL;. ... Riggins \ Hecnic.

Power Corp., 722 P.2d 819, X ^: v.

*M,

The need for positive expei t testimony to establish a
causal link between the defendants' negligent act and
the plaintiff's injury depends upon the nature of the
injury. Where the injury ii wolves obscure medical
factors which are beyond an ordinary lay person's
knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a
finding, there must be expert testimony that the
negligent act probably caused the injiiry
In the instant case, Ms. Beard had suffered horn neck \KU\\ and headaches
for yeaib \

...

surgeries took place many i

She had also complained of aching >i. n*

f

r

accident in qi lestion. If her surgeon

couldn't determine whether the conditioiis lot v\ IIH II lie operated were probably related
ic III i injury at Kmart, how is a lay jury capable of u* :..
guesswoik? Hssuiii

•. - .

. courts agree that the "diagnosis anu
1

nnr^
•

-

of

a disease are medical questions to be established by physicians as expert witnesses and
not by lay persons". Eberhart v. Morris Brown College, 352 S.E.2d 832, 834 (Ga.
App. 1987).
Dr. Peterson testified that he operated upon plaintiff to attempt to alleviate
a severe degenerative disease process which existed prior to plaintiffs accident at
Kmart. He also testified that he had no opinion about any connection between the
incident at Kmart and Ms. Beard's need for carpal tunnel surgery. In the absence of
any other medical testimony on these issues, it was error for the court below to refuse
to take the causation question from the jury.
Plaintiff cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions suggesting that
medical bills can be admissible and can support a finding that plaintiff incurred special
damages for reasonable medical expenses, even without expert testimony that the
treatment for which the bills were received was necessitated by the injury in question in
the lawsuit. The issue in the instant case does not concern the admissibility of medical
bills. It is whether the cause of the need for surgery must be established by a witness
with sufficient expertise to form an opinion on that question. Because the issue is one
which is beyond knowledge of a layman, expert medical testimony must be offered to
support any verdict finding an accident to be the proximate cause of a plaintiffs need
for surgery. This requirement can be demonstrated by the cases cited by plaintiff. For
example, plaintiff cites Jordan v. Smoot, 380 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. App. 1989), for the
proposition that expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a connection between an

injury and its iivaiiiinii

wiiile Jordan did so hold, it did so because the tre;

a limited amount oi cl - ; r ?

,.

. ; plaintiff received immediately following

her accident. This, the court had, uibV•<<:;

-ni one like Eberhart v.

Morris Brown College. 352 S.E.2d 832 (Ga.App. 1987), • f"
was pn.\s<Mik\I

medical question

In Eberhart, the court upheld a directed verdict against the pl.onutt lor

failing to present any medical tesiunony establishing the connection between his injury
and his subsequent treatment sometime ihett\i!fn

, NIOUH*? ihat Georgia has a statute

tha authorizes the admission of medical bills, the court

-a

a,a

^a a

»;ff to prove medical issues b> lay lesuinui:

stai
held thai It W d 5 ,

!

"

' : CLa the verdict against plaintiff.

Had appellant addressed additional medical testimony
that his subsequent physical condition was a possible
resuli nf his prior lootball injury, the jury would
perhaps have been authorized to award appellant
those medical expenses as special damages that he
sought. However, appellant produced no such
medical evidence. Accordingly, the tiial court <i;d
not err in granting a directed verdiu n\ tavui o\
appellee.
.. > i: ,,\ ?.t 834-35.
... .---ion of whether the need for a surgery is the proximate la-oili -»i t
particular accident is siinpl\ IH*VI-n*• 'he common knowledge of lay people. It was for
this reason that in Townsend v. Stamper 3()X S W ."M •!"• i Ky App. 1965), a case cited
;jured

physici

•*

party not only produced medic

,. -ar treating

!•*• lat plaintiffs need for disc surgery was \ * ?.
3

injury in the automobile accident which was the subject of her lawsuit. 398 S.W.2d at
49.
In the instant case, the surgeon who performed plaintiffs neck and wrist
surgeries was unable to form an opinion that those procedures were causally related to
her injury at Kmart. It was, therefore, improper to permit the jury to speculate about
the causation issue, and the court below should have instructed the jury that plaintiff
had failed to prove that the surgeries were proximately caused by her accident at
Kmart, as defendant requested. The failure to so instruct was prejudicial because it
allowed plaintiff to suggest to the jury that she should be entitled to substantial
compensation simply because she had to undergo these surgical procedures. The
holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Rd.
Co., 292 p.2d 849 (Utah 1956), was precisely that failure to instruct the jury that
plaintiff had not proved proximate cause between an injury and a particular medical
condition required that the judgment be set aside and the case remanded for trial upon
proper instructions. It is always prejudicial to allow a jury to consider claims for which
there is no sufficient evidence. See, Mikkelsen v. Haslam. 764 p.2d 1384 (Utah App.
1988).
The failure of the Court to remove the issue of the causation for the neck
and wrist surgeries permitted the jury to base its award, to some extent, on the
happening of those events. As has been previously noted, it is prejudicial error to
allow a jury to consider, in its award of damages, physical problems which have not
4

been established by expert testimony to have been proximately caused by the accident
in issue.
The jury was not instructed that it must find medical
evidence establishing that the injury and/or surgery
probably caused the hip pain and headaches [of which
she was complaining]. This deficiency constitutes
reversible error requiring a new trial on the issue of
damages.
Riggins v. Bechtel Power Corp.. 722 P.2d 819, 824-25 (Wash.App. 1986).
The failure to remove the surgery causation issue from the jury obviously
misled them into assuming, as plaintiff's counsel argued, that they were free to consider
the need for such surgeries when calculating their damage award. A court's failure to
direct a verdict on an issue, or to instruct properly, " . . . is reversible error if it tends
to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party . . .". Mikkelsen, supra,
at 1387. Our Supreme Court has expressly held that the failure to take away from the
jury consideration of a claimed injury not supported by medical evidence is just such
prejudicial error. Moore, supra, at 851.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff in this case is a woman who underwent numerous surgeries
to various parts of her body, including her foot, knee, wrists and neck, after being
struck in the head. Her neck surgeon acknowledged that he diagnosed her as having a
degenerative disease of the cervical spine which she admitted to another physician had
been limiting her activities for nine years. Given these preexisting problems, an

5

obvious question arose regarding in what way, if at all, the Kmart incident contributed
to her need for the various and multiple surgeries. With regard to her neck and wrist
surgeries, plaintiff offered no medical evidence that these procedures were the probable
result of the Kmart incident. In the absence of such evidence, it was error for the court
below to fail to direct the verdict on these issues and instruct the jury that plaintiff had
not proved that the challenged surgeries were a proximate result of her injury at Kmart.
Accordingly, the judgment entered below should be vacated and the case remanded for
a new trial on the issue of damages.
DATED thisi2%ay of July, 2000.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. Efavid Eckersley
Attorneys for Appellant
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